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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, a legislative enactment would be of little assistance in
distinguishing the types of negligence for each case must be decided
on its own particular facts."
It has been suggested that in view of the statute making the
driver of a motor vehicle who leaves the scene of an accident guilty of
a misdemeanor,' 2 that a similar "measure should be enacted imposing
upon a person who negligently starts a fire a duty to take all reason-
able means, short of risking serious injury, to give warning to those
whose lives he has placed in jeopardy". 13
S. S. N.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIAILITY OF WIFE FOR SUPPORT OF
HUSBAND ON PUBLIC RELIEF-SECTIONS 125 AND 128 OF PUBLIC
WELFARE LAw.-The defendant and her husband were married Oc-
tober 8, 1901. Her husband received, from the Department of Public
Welfare of the City of New York, monthly payments as old age se-
curity relief aggregating $2,025, between September 1, 1931 and July
1, 1935. During most of this time, she was of meagre means, posses-
sing neither real nor personal property, until the .death of her uncle.
By his will, she received on May 1, 1935, $1,000. She has since re-
ceived several thousand dollars on account of her distributive share
which will total $29,000. The plaintiff, Commissioner of Public Wel-
fare of the City of New York, seeks to recover from the defendant,
under Section 128 of the Public Welfare Law,' the entire sum paid
requiring as a substitute for criminal intent, intent implied in fact?" (Italics
ours.) (1937) 6 FoR. L. REv. 309, n. 3.
'IN. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 70, subd. 5-a.
'See note 11, supra.
1 N. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 125 (L. 1929 c. 565 effective Jan. 1, 1930)
creates the liability, and relatives may be compelled to support under N. Y.
PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 126 or N. Y. CODE OF CGRIM. PRO. § 915. See Hodson
v. Grumlich, 156 Misc. 199, 280 N. Y. Supp. 193 (1935).
N. Y. PuBLIC WELFARE LAW § 126: "Liability of relatives to support.
The husband, wife, father, mother, grandparent, child or grandchild of a recp-
ient of public relief, or of a person liable to become in need of public relief,
shall, if of sufficient ability be responsible for the support of such person."
Note: N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRO. § 914, amended by L. 1933, c. 589, is now
similar to this portion of N. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW.
N. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 128: "Recovery from a person discovered
to have property. A public welfare official may bring an action against a
person discovered to have real or personal property * * * if such person, or
anyone for whose support he is or was liable received relief or care during the
preceding ten years, and shall be entitled to recover up to the value of such
property the cost of relief. Any public relief received by such person shall
constitute an implied contract."
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RECENT DECISIONS
to her husband. The defendant contends that the obligation created
by this section is unreasonable, arbitrary, and unconstitutional insofar
as it applies to marriages contracted before the enactment of the law.
Held, the statute adds a new incident to marriages contracted before
and after its enactment, but in no event can liability arise for relief
payments made prior to the enactment. And too, this liability is not
absolute, arising only if and when the wife is capable of bearing the
burden, as in the case at bar from May 1, 1935. Hodson v. Stapleton,
248 App. Div. 524, 290 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1936).
The moral obligation of support and maintenance commensurate
with his means, which a husband owed to his wife and family, was
early recognized as a legal duty at common law,2 and later expressly
provided for by statute.3 The converse of that proposition, namely
that the wife owes duty of support to her husband, was never recog-
nized as true at common law.4 The moral obligation to support and
aid when in need was always present, however, and it was gradually
strengthened by the various enabling acts and the general modern
desire for equality of the sexes. It was not, however, until the passage
of the Public Welfare Law r that this moral obligation, which had
gradually grown stronger, became established as a legal reality, at-
taching to every marriage in existence.
To establish this liability, there must be a concurrence of indigence
of the husband or a relative 6 plus the ability of the wife to support
the needy one. This new liability of the wife is not, as in the hus-
band's common law duty to support, imposed regardless of her cir-
cumstances. The wife, in the words of the statute,7 "if of sufficient
ability", becomes liable. This duty, therefore, differs from that of
the husband, in that it is not absolute.
The statute is not retroactive. True, to every existing marriage
it adds this new obligation. Liability, however, does not arise for
relief given prior to the passage of this Act and attaches from the date
It should be noted that under this section, the City may recover from one
liable to support under § 125 when support has already been given, provided the
person liable has real or personal property. The remedy afforded by this section
differs from § 125; see Hodson v. Grumlich, 156 Misc. 199, 280 N. Y. Supp.
193 (1035).
In Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 (1882) the Poor Authorities recov-
ered from husband, in absence of this statute.
'Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 174 App. Div. 416, 161 N. Y. Supp. 166 (1st
Dept. 1916) ; Stevens v. Hush, 107 Misc. 353, 176 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1919).
'N. Y. PuBuic WELFAPE LAW § 125; Dox. REL. COURT AcT § 101, subd.
1 (effective Oct. 1, 1933). These statutes merely restate the common law duty
and provide a means of enforcing the liability. They add nothing to the
husband's former duty of support as known to the common law.
'Young v. Valentine, 177 N. Y. 347, 69 N. E. 643 (1904).
'N. Y. PuBLic W-LFARE LAW effective Jan. 1, 1930.
IN. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 125 makes a wife liable for the support,
not only of her husband but also her children, grandchildren and parents, and
grandparents.
IN. Y. PUBLIc WFLFARE LAW § 125.
1937]
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when the person liable was "of sufficient ability". Since the statute
produces a radical change in the common law doctrine of support, it
must be strictly construed.8
The defendant's contention that the Act 9 is unconstitutional was
lightly dismissed by the court on the ground that the general question
has been too well settled in this jurisdiction to be argued at this late
date. It has been repeatedly held that although marriage is called a
civil contract 10 and though it possesses many contractual character-
istics, it is not a contract within the meaning of that clause of the
Federal Constitution which prohibits a state from passing laws im-
pairing the obligations of contracts." Instead it has been viewed 12
as a social institution avidly protected and regulated by the state.
M. M. B.
MOTOR VEHICLEs-NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-GUEST
RuLE.-This is an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to
have been sustained by the plaintiffs, husband and wife, who were
passengers in an automobile operated by their son, which, while turn-
ing to the left into a side street, was struck by the car of the defendant,
approaching from the opposite direction. The trial judge, in accor-
dance with the request of plaintiffs' counsel, charged the jury, that
even though the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which
the plaintiffs were riding contributed to the injury, the plaintiffs may
still recover if the jury finds the negligence of the defendant was the
direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiffs.
Trial term held for defendant, Appellate Division affirmed. On
appeal, held, judgment for defendant affirmed. Anderson v. Burkardt,
275 N. Y. 281, 9 N. E. (2d) 929 (1937).
The charge as to contributory negligence taken as a whole in
connection with the evidence to which it was to apply was sufficient.'
It is a question of fact and not of law as to whether the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.2
Proximate cause is any cause which in natural and continuous se-
quence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
'Op. Arr'Y GEN. (1934) 51 St. Dept. 258.
IN. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW §§ 125, 128.
" N. Y. DOMESTIC RELATION LAW § 10; O'Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y. 296(1868) ("Thereby distinguishing it from a religious sacrament"); Wade v.
Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282 (1874).
'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888) ; White v. White,
5 Barb. 476 (1848).
"Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282 (1874).
1 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
2 Hutchins v. Emery, 134 Me. 205, 183 At. 754 (1936).
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